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Th e scholarship on policy diff usion in political science 
and public administration is extensive. Th is article 
provides an introduction to that literature for scholars, 
students, and practitioners. It off ers seven lessons derived 
from that literature, built from numerous empirical 
studies and applied to contemporary policy debates. Based 
on these seven lessons, the authors off er guidance to policy 
makers and present opportunities for future research to 
students and scholars of policy diff usion.
Over the past 50 years, scholars have published nearly 1,000 research articles in political science and public administration journals 
about “policy diff usion.” Th is interest in how policies 
spread from one government to the next has been 
increasing among scholars and practitioners alike. Yet, 
although this focus has produced numerous insights 
into the policy-making process, the sheer volume of 
scholarship makes it diffi  cult to identify and under-
stand the key fi ndings and lessons. Indeed, it is hard 
to see the forest through all of these trees.1 In this 
article, we step back and draw seven lessons from the 
literature and its current direction. Our review has 
three main purposes: First, this article may serve as 
an introduction for readers who are largely unfamiliar 
with policy diff usion. Second, practitioners may better 
understand diff usion pressures and their impacts on 
policy choices by focusing on key lessons. And fi nally, 
scholars who are interested in policy adoption, inno-
vation, and diff usion may fi nd new research directions 
in the takeaway points off ered here. Th us, our goal is 
to provide insights to both practitioners and scholars, 
knowing that this necessarily entails sacrifi cing some 
depth and specifi city in order to capture broad lessons 
of general interest.
In its most generic form, policy diff usion is defi ned as 
one government’s policy choices being infl uenced by 
the choices of other governments. With this defi nition 
in hand, the importance of policy diff usion is undeni-
able. Th ose who wish to understand why governments 
adopt particular policies would be hard-pressed to 
fi nd examples of policies that are selected entirely 
for internal reasons. Policy makers rely on examples 
and insights from those who have experimented with 
policies in the past. Government offi  cials worry about 
the impact that the policies of others will have on 
their own jurisdictions. Th e world is connected today 
as never before, and those connections structure the 
policy opportunities and constraints faced by policy 
makers at the local, regional, state, national, and 
international levels.
In the American context, for example, health policy 
cannot be understood without assessing both the 
eff ects of state experiments on the formulation of 
national policies and the subsequent eff ects of those 
national policies on the states.2 Welfare reforms off er 
opportunities to learn from other governments’ earlier 
policies while trying to avoid becoming attractive 
to a needy population. Local and state governments 
compete for businesses with various tax incentives. 
Th e centralization of education policy in recent 
decades, with more funding provided and regulatory 
controls exerted by state and national governments, 
has  dramatically altered local choices by superintend-
ents and school boards. And the U.S. experience is 
not unique. External factors infl uence internal policy 
choices in every major policy area around the world. 
As just one example, pressure on European Union 
countries facing debt crises to adopt austerity meas-
ures by other member governments illustrates how 
policy diff usion considerations do not stop at national 
borders.
In today’s interconnected world, understanding policy 
diff usion is crucial to understanding policy  advocacy 
and policy change more broadly. For instance, 
given that state governments may learn from local 
 antismoking experiences, is an antismoking group 
better served by targeting its limited resources toward 
advocating change at the local level or at the state 
level (see, e.g., Shipan and Volden 2006)? And, given 
numerous policy diff usion pressures, can scholars 
be confi dent in their explanations of policy choices 
without adequately accounting for external infl uences 
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2011), and the rate at which innovations spread has accelerated 
(Boushey 2010). Whereas prior policy makers may have been 
limited to  learning only from the experiences of nearby neighbors, 
today’s sophisticated politicians and administrators have a much 
greater capacity to look far and wide for useful solutions to policy 
problems. Although these changes make detecting policy diff usion 
more diffi  cult than merely exploring geographic clusters, they off er 
amazing opportunities for better policy choice and make the fi eld 
of policy diff usion studies more interesting and signifi cant than ever 
before.
Lesson 2: Governments Compete with One Another
Responding to claims that governments cannot be as effi  cient or 
innovative as the free market, Charles Tiebout (1956) presented 
a model in which local governments compete with one another, 
 off ering policies that are attractive to residents who sort themselves 
into jurisdictions based on their preferences for taxes and spending. 
Th is work launched a massive scholarly research stream of its own 
and drew attention to the idea of competition across governments.
In terms of policy diff usion, such competition aff ects the choices 
of other governments. A city that fi nds its middle-class residents 
moving to the suburbs for better schools may need to respond 
with education reforms of its own, or instead 
it may cater to other possible residents by 
focusing on altogether diff erent alterna-
tives, such as attracting a professional sports 
team or improving public transportation. 
Th is example illustrates the breadth of the 
concept of policy diff usion. Not merely the 
study of whether the same policies spread 
across governments, policy diff usion broadly 
encompasses the interrelated decisions of 
governments, even when one government’s 
education policies infl uence another’s transportation or entertain-
ment policies.
While much of the economics literature that followed Tiebout 
focused on the wasteful nature of tax competition across states 
and localities (e.g., Wilson 1999), literatures in political science, 
public administration, and sociology turned to examples of public 
 spending, regulation, and the production of public and private 
goods. For example, Berry and Berry (1990) demonstrate competi-
tion across state borders as one key determinant of state lottery 
adoption. Such competition is not merely reactive to the decisions of 
other states, but also can be strategic, anticipatory, and preemptive 
(e.g., Baybeck, Berry, and Siegel 2011).
It is in the realm of “redistributive” policies that competition-based 
policy diff usion has generated some of the most heated policy 
exchanges. Here, scholars and practitioners have focused on the 
possibility of a “race to the bottom” in social programs such as 
welfare. As articulated by Peterson and Rom (1990) in the American 
 context, state policy makers worry about becoming “welfare 
 magnets,” to which potential recipients move in order to receive 
higher benefi ts. Such fears may lead state governments to undercut 
one another in their redistributive services, eventually racing toward 
undesirable social safety nets. Th e race-to-the-bottom concept 
fueled major policy discussions about the likely impacts of welfare 
(see, e.g., Berry 1994)? Th e following lessons begin to answer the 
numerous questions that arise once scholars and practitioners turn 
their focus to policy diff usion.
Lesson 1: Policy Diffusion Is Not (Merely) 
the Geographic Clustering of Similar Policies
Th e spread of a policy innovation from one government to the next 
tends to bring to mind spatial imagery, such as ripples spreading 
from a pebble dropped in a pond. Indeed, early work on policy dif-
fusion emphasized this sort of eff ect, usually conceived of as regional 
clustering (e.g., Walker 1969). Th is classic view of policy diff usion 
continued into recent decades. Even when the methodological 
sophistication of event history analysis began to allow external and 
internal determinants of policy choices to be examined simultane-
ously (Berry and Berry 1990), diff usion forces were often measured 
merely by the number of geographically neighboring states that had 
already adopted the given policy. Presumably, if scholars control 
for the internal reasons for a policy adoption and fi nd evidence 
that  earlier choices of neighbors still matter, then policy diff usion is 
relevant to understanding such adoptions.
While off ering a good starting point, the classic view of policy dif-
fusion as geographic clustering is often overly limiting, sometimes 
misleading (or even wrong), and increasingly 
outdated. Th is view is overly limiting because 
there are many reasons why policy  makers 
look beyond their own jurisdictions in mak-
ing policy choices. Lessons about how to deal 
with budget defi cits in California need not 
be drawn only from Oregon, Nevada, and 
Arizona. Detroit is not competing for business 
only with Cleveland and Ann Arbor, but also 
with Toronto, Shanghai, and Seoul. And, as 
countries wrestle with how to downsize their 
social programs, their quest for answers does not stop at nearby 
 borders, but instead extends to larger regions or even worldwide 
(e.g., Brooks 2005; Weyland 2007).
Moreover, even when geographic clustering may be theoretically 
important, appearances of such clustering may be misleading. 
Similar governments often face the same types of problems and 
opportunities at about the same times. Which states were likely to 
reinstate the death penalty after the U.S. Supreme Court rulings of 
the 1970s (Mooney and Lee 1999)? Which governments around 
the world would adopt e-government and e-democracy practices 
when the relevant technologies became available (Lee, Chang, and 
Berry 2011)? How would states develop and modify enterprise 
zones given federal incentives (Mossberger 2000)? Because similar 
states tend to adopt similar policies, and because geographically 
 neighboring states tend to have many political, economic, and 
demographic similarities, evidence of geographic policy  clustering 
may have little to do with policy diff usion—that is, with one 
government’s policy choices depending on others’ policies (Volden, 
Ting, and Carpenter 2008).
In today’s world, with low barriers to communication and travel, 
the classic view of policy diff usion as geographic clustering is 
growing increasingly outdated. Over time, the lists of the most 
 innovative American states have changed (Boehmke and Skinner 
While off ering a good  starting 
point, the classic view of 
policy diff usion as  geographic 
 clustering is often overly 
 limiting, sometimes  misleading 
(or even wrong), 
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Given the political nature of policy choices, the multifaceted 
goals of policy makers, and the complexity of policies themselves, 
learning-based policy diff usion may be limited in a variety of ways. 
Weyland (2007), for example, demonstrates how national policy 
makers throughout Latin America were infl uenced by a series of 
biases and heuristics in developing their pension reform processes 
rather than making rational assessments based on all available 
information. Moynihan (2008) shows how policy makers rely on 
their networks to learn under uncertainty and during times of crisis. 
Learning about others’ policies and then eff ectively using lessons 
learned to solve one’s own policy problems is time intensive and 
takes a high degree of skill. Time-pressed policy makers, those with 
limited staff  support, and those generalists who have not had the 
opportunity to gain specialized expertise will not be able to take full 
advantage of others’ policy experiences.
Limits on the capacity to learn from others can be overcome, 
at least partially, by technological advances and by go-between 
actors. Low-cost communication and travel allow today’s policy 
 makers to attend conferences to exchange ideas, to venture forth 
on  fact-fi nding trips, and to exchange information widely while 
sitting at their own desks. Interstate professional organizations 
such as the National Conference of State Legislatures or the 
National Governors Association off er clearinghouses of informa-
tion about the policies adopted by other governments (e.g., Balla 
2001). Similar organizations exist at other levels of government 
and around the world. Füglister (2012), for example, shows that 
membership in intergovernmental health policy conferences in 
Switzerland increases the likelihood that a canton will learn about 
and then adopt successful policies found in other cantons. Informal 
personal networks also help with the search for appropriate policies 
(e.g., Binz-Scharf, Lazer, and Mergel 2012). Additionally, policy 
advocates and entrepreneurs can step in to inform policy makers 
about policies that they believe would be attractive and eff ective 
in a new jurisdiction (e.g., Haas 1992; Mintrom 1997). However, 
although these groups and individuals may help overcome lim-
its to learning, they also bring with them their own biases and 
limitations.
Lesson 4: Policy Diffusion Is Not Always Benefi cial
Competition across governments may help remove ineffi  ciencies, 
eliminate waste, match services to residents’ desires, or hold down 
taxes, mimicking market incentives. Learning among governments 
can produce experimentation and more eff ective policy choices. Yet 
competition may also produce a race to the 
bottom in certain redistributive programs, 
and the wrong lessons can often be drawn 
from others’ experiences (e.g., Sharman 2010; 
Soule 1999).3 Th erefore, while it is important 
to recognize the favorable aspects of policy 
diff usion, it would be wrong to declare inter-
related policy decisions across governments 
always benefi cial.
Scholars have identifi ed four main mechanisms of policy diff usion: 
competition and learning, as discussed earlier, but also imitation 
and coercion (e.g., Shipan and Volden 2008). Imitation is the 
copying of another government’s policies without concern for those 
policies’ eff ects; thus, the extent of learning in these circumstances 
devolution in the mid-1990s and generated sizable scholarly litera-
tures about why and where poor people move (e.g., Bailey 2005) 
and about the incentives of state policy makers (e.g., Volden 1997).
Although competition across states, localities, and countries exists 
in a wide range of policy areas, from taxes to welfare to trade, 
its importance for policy choices should not be overstated. For 
instance, the evidence that potential welfare recipients move across 
state lines for greater welfare benefi ts is mixed at best. For many 
other policy areas, ranging from county foster care policies, to state 
regulations on youth access to tobacco, to national disease control 
policies, governments have little or nothing to gain from competi-
tion. In many cases, governments set aside competition altogether, 
solving their problems collectively through interstate compacts or 
multilateral trade agreements. And more pernicious forms of com-
petition across states have been explicitly disallowed; for example, 
the commerce clause of the U.S. Constitution keeps states from 
engaging in their own trade wars against one another.
Lesson 3: Governments Learn from Each Other
In his famous dissenting opinion in the case New State Ice Co. v 
Liebmann, U.S. Supreme Court Justice Louis D. Brandeis wrote, 
“It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single 
courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; 
and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to 
the rest of the country” (285 U.S. 262 [1932], 311). In order for 
governments to fully serve their roles as laboratories of democracy, 
policy makers must act as scientists, watching these experiments 
and learning from them. Indeed, the policy diff usion literature has 
recently provided substantial evidence of governments learning from 
one another’s experiences.
Meseguer (2006), for example, fi nds that countries learn from the 
eff ectiveness of others’ trade liberalization policies and  structure 
their own policies as a result. Volden (2006) shows that the 
American states that were best able to reduce their uninsured rates 
among poor children were most likely to have their children’s health 
insurance programs copied by other states. Gilardi, Füglister, and 
Luyet (2009) establish that countries are more likely to change their 
hospital fi nancing policies when they are ineff ective and that these 
governments tend to adopt policies found to be eff ective elsewhere.
Such learning takes us far afi eld from the geographic clustering of 
policies. Th e best and most relevant experiments may be across 
the country or halfway around the world. 
Moreover, what is learned may have more 
to do with political opportunity than with 
policy eff ectiveness. Policies are complex, 
and the goals of policy makers vary from one 
government to the next. Success in contain-
ing costs may be more attractive to some than 
success in improving health outcomes, for 
example. Electorally minded politicians may 
care about the political success achieved rather 
than the policy  success (Gilardi 2010), may look for political cover 
when adopting unpopular policies such as tax increases (Berry and 
Berry 1992), or may seek to learn not only about better policies but 
also about how better to compete with other governments (Guler, 
Guillén, and Macpherson 2002).
While it is important to 
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policies might have on statewide antismoking policies. On one 
hand, there could be a “snowball eff ect,” whereby the momentum 
from the adoption of more local antismoking restrictions leads to a 
greater likelihood of state adoption. On the other hand, there could 
be a “pressure valve eff ect,” whereby the adoption of  antismoking 
restrictions in all of the localities that really want them takes 
 pressure off  the state government to act.
Given that both of these eff ects seem plausible, we set out to learn 
which eff ect occurs and, if both do, which political features within 
a state might produce one eff ect instead of the other. We found that 
both of these eff ects do indeed take place, but which eff ect predomi-
nated was determined by interest group politics and by the capacity 
of the state legislature. For example, in states with an active and 
strong health lobby in the state legislature, local adoptions positively 
infl uenced the likelihood of state adoptions, as these lobbyists could 
point to favorable local experiences. States without strong health 
lobbyists were not only less likely to adopt antismoking restrictions 
overall, but even less likely still to do so if localities had already 
adopted a number of restrictions.
In terms of capacity, about a dozen states do not pay their legislators 
any annual salary at all, beyond covering per diem expenses; some 
legislatures do not meet for more than a few months every year or 
two; and many do not hire extensive legislative staff s. Such circum-
stances profoundly infl uence policy diff usion processes. Because of 
their lower capacity, these “less professional” state legislatures exhibit 
a strong pressure valve eff ect. If the localities adopted antismoking 
restrictions, that action removed the problem from the state policy 
agenda. Legislators could move on to more pressing business or 
return home to their primary jobs. In contrast, the most  professional 
(and higher-capacity) states exhibited the strongest snowball eff ect, 
with state legislators clamoring to take local policies, extend them 
statewide, and use their policy achievements as grounds to advance 
their political careers.5
In a follow-up study (Shipan and Volden 2008), we assessed which 
diff usion mechanisms led localities to adopt these  antismoking 
restrictions in the fi rst place and discover that policy-making 
 capacity once again had a signifi cant impact. Larger cities learned 
greatly from earlier localities’ experiences and resisted preemptive 
pressures from their state government. In contrast, policy makers in 
smaller communities were less likely to learn and more likely to be 
 buff eted by state policy-making decisions. Such small towns were 
also more susceptible to competition, fearful of losing diners to 
nearby  neighbors if they adopted restaurant restrictions, and they 
were more likely to imitate the policies of 
larger cities, even those policies were inappro-
priate for their own communities.
Th ese two studies refl ect a larger literature 
on the conditional nature of policy diff usion. 
Th e particular networks in which govern-
ments are embedded infl uence their oppor-
tunities for learning. Recent experiences and present policies aff ect 
policy diff usion. Stone (1999), for example, argues that govern-
ments facing an economic crisis or experiencing a recent military 
defeat are more susceptible to coercion. Bailey and Rom (2004) 
show that initially generous governments are more responsive to 
is merely the acknowledgment that a government that is perceived 
to be a leader has the policy and that it must, therefore, be some-
thing desirable. Imitation may be thought of as the policy diff usion 
equivalent of “keeping up with the Joneses,” with of all the associ-
ated negative aspects of such an approach. Th e voting public may 
demand the adoption of policies that they have seen or experienced 
elsewhere, regardless of whether those policies are ultimately  suitable 
in their home community (e.g., Pacheco 2012). Cities where profes-
sional sports teams would not thrive seek them out nonetheless. 
State legislatures exactly copy bills written in other states, typos 
and all. Countries without the proper economic and educational 
foundations overbuild their infrastructure and industrial parks in 
the hope that doing so will attract businesses. Sometimes this spread 
of untested ideas works, but often, it results in inappropriate and 
understudied policy choices.
Coercion is the use of force, threats, or incentives by one govern-
ment to aff ect the policy decisions of another. An extreme example is 
armed confl ict, a concern that has generated its own sizable  diff usion 
literature (e.g., Most and Starr 1980). But coercion need not rely on 
the threat of military confl ict. Instead, economic power can pro-
vide the foundation for coercion, as seen in the recent attempt by 
Germany to bring about austerity measures in Greece. Th e example 
of International Monetary Fund incentives leading developing coun-
tries to adopt certain liberalization practices shows how international 
organizations can be used to facilitate policy diff usion. Coercion can 
also be seen in a top-down version of policy diff usion, such as when 
the U.S. federal government attaches restrictions to intergovernmen-
tal grants (e.g., Welch and Th ompson 1980).4
As with other coercive activities, the use of grant incentives to 
 infl uence policies at lower levels of government can be either 
 benefi cial or harmful. Given the intergovernmental competition 
(noted earlier) that could result from the underprovision of redis-
tributive policies, the U.S. government has long used matching 
grants for programs such as welfare or Medicaid, encouraging a 
greater level of state funding by substantially increasing the bang 
from a state’s buck. More direct vertical policy coercion comes in 
the form of unfunded mandates of states and localities or preemp-
tive clauses restricting the policy discretion of states or localities. 
As an example of how localities prefer their own policy choices 
over statewide choices, Conlisk et al. (1995) note the case of 
North Carolina, which adopted statewide smoking restrictions in 
1993 that would preempt any local laws passed after the  following 
October 15. In the three months before the preemption took eff ect, 
the number of local antismoking restrictions soared from 16 to 105, 
indicating a strong preference for local control 
over state preemption. In sum, the policy 
diff usion concept captures the  interrelated 
policy decisions across governments, whether 
they are based favorably on the normatively 
appealing concepts of cooperation and learn-
ing or less favorably on the manipulation of 
incentives.
Lesson 5: Politics and Government Capabilities 
Are Important to Diffusion
In earlier work (Shipan and Volden 2006), we explored an instance 
of bottom-up policy diff usion, asking what eff ect local  antismoking 
Th e particular networks 
in which governments are 
 embedded infl uence their 
opportunities for learning.
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most complex policies, for which one state’s experiences may not 
translate well to other states. And there was no learning-based policy 
diff usion whatsoever observed among the set of policies that could 
be easily tried and abandoned, presumably because the internal trials 
served as a substitute for learning from the experiences of others.
Th ese fi ndings complement earlier results in the policy diff usion 
literature that demonstrate the role of innovation attributes in 
diff usion processes beyond the policy realm (Rogers 2003). Other 
ways of separating one policy from another, however, have  produced 
mixed fi ndings. For example, Mooney and Lee (1995, 1999) 
fi nd that both morality policies and economic policies diff use in 
similar ways, albeit for diff erent reasons. Nicholson-Crotty (2009) 
shows that the salience of a policy increases its rate of diff usion. 
And Boushey (2010) explores how some policy adoptions occur as 
“ outbreaks,” where they are adopted so quickly across  governments 
as to draw into question whether any diff usion processes were 
involved in their adoption at all.
Just as the political environment and policy maker capacity help 
determine how and why policies diff use, so, too, does the policy 
context and the nature of the policies themselves. Scholars and prac-
titioners should not expect the same degree 
of competition surrounding policies limiting 
youth access to tobacco as over welfare poli-
cies, the same amount of learning about trash 
collection as about education reforms, or the 
same types of coercion over crime policies as 
for economic and trade policies. Th e lessons 
off ered here, therefore, must be seen in light 
of political circumstances and policy contexts.
Lesson 7: Decentralization Is Crucial for Policy Diffusion
Th roughout the 1980s and 1990s, the U.S. federal government took 
steps to devolve control over some policy areas, such as welfare, to 
the state and local levels. More recently, such trends have reversed, 
with greater centralization in areas such as education and health 
care. Beyond the American experience, other federal systems have 
similarly been reassessing which levels of government should control 
which policy areas. Centralization has also played a major role on 
the international stage, such as through the creation and expansion 
of the European Union.
Some of the benefi ts of centralization include economies of scale 
and reduced redundancy in maintaining policy infrastructures, 
 limits on harmful competitive practices across governments, and 
proper restrictions on negative spillovers (e.g., limiting harmful 
environmental pollutants that otherwise would be foisted on neigh-
boring jurisdictions). Some of the costs of centralization include 
the loss of horizontal competition (along with its effi  ciency gains), 
reduced policy experimentation and learning, and a decreased 
 ability to use local knowledge to match policies to heterogeneous 
local preferences. Most of these considerations involve key aspects of 
policy diff usion.
Building on the work of Oates (1968) and Musgrave (1969), 
Peterson (1995) argues that state and local governments are best 
able to handle “developmental” policies, such as education, in 
which local preferences vary and experimentation and learning are 
competitive pressures in their redistributive policies than those that 
already have low benefi t levels.
Th ese conditional factors and the mechanisms of diff usion may 
themselves change throughout the diff usion process (e.g., Kwon, 
Berry, and Feiock 2009). Competition matters more among early 
policy adopters (Mooney 2001), whereas coercion is a more potent 
factor among late adopters (Welch and Th ompson 1980). And the 
eff ect of learning increases over time, as more evidence becomes 
available (Gilardi, Füglister, and Luyet 2009). Because late policy 
adopters tend to be poorer, smaller, and less cosmopolitan than early 
adopters (e.g., Crain 1966; Walker 1969), their political circum-
stances and policy-making capacities may well infl uence whether 
they take advantage of their learning opportunities, give in to 
coercion, or make no policy change at all. Finally, within any given 
government, diff usion mechanisms take on greater or diminished 
importance at diff erent stages of the policy formation process, 
 interacting with electoral and political constraints as a policy moves 
from the agenda-setting stage, to information gathering, to customi-
zation (Karch 2007).
Lesson 6: Policy Diffusion Depends on the Policies 
Themselves
Th e foregoing examples note a wide vari-
ety of policies that have spread from one 
government to another. Yet each policy is 
 diff erent, often in a variety of ways. For 
example, in criminal justice policy making, 
some policy changes, such as developing new 
RICO (Racketeer Infl uenced and Corrupt 
Organizations Act)  standards to prosecute 
organized crime, are quite complex; others are 
straightforward, such as lowering the drunk driving standard from 
0.10 to 0.08 percent blood alcohol content. Some changes, such 
as  extending laws on theft to include credit card theft, are easily 
compatible with prior practices; others, such as “three strikes” laws, 
represent substantial breaks from the past. Do diff erences across 
the complexity or compatibility of laws aff ect the nature of policy 
diff usion?
To answer this question, Makse and Volden (2011) study the 
 diff usion of 27 diff erent criminal justice laws across the American 
states over a 30-year period. Th ey rely on expert surveys to rate each 
policy on fi ve dimensions: complexity and compatibility (as in the 
 foregoing examples), as well as observability (whether the eff ects 
could be easily seen by others), relative advantage (whether the 
policy is perceived to have signifi cant advantages over past policy), 
and trialability (whether the policy could be experimented with 
in a limited manner). Th e authors fi nd that all fi ve factors matter 
in explaining the spread of these policies. Complex policies spread 
more slowly, whereas compatible policies spread more quickly. 
Additionally, observability, relative advantage, and trialability all 
enhanced the rate of adoption and diff usion.
Perhaps more intriguingly, the nature of how these policies spread 
across the states was aff ected by the characteristics of the  policies. For 
example, compared to policies whose eff ects were highly observable, 
those with low observability were half as likely to exhibit learning-
based diff usion. Similarly, learning eff ects were cut in half for the 
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control over complex and evolving policies that may be best solved 
over time through experimentation and learning. Th ey should also 
be reluctant to decentralize policy decisions that may create negative 
competition, ill-considered policy imitation, or undue coercion. 
Especially at risk in such devolution decisions are those governments 
with the least capacity to learn from others and the greatest suscepti-
bility to competition and coercion, such as smaller towns or poorer 
states and countries.
The Future of Policy Diffusion
Policy diff usion is not just a term to describe the geographic 
clustering of policies. Rather, it encompasses a broad array of 
 interdependent policy choices across governments. Th e  mechanisms 
of policy diff usion include competition across governments, 
 learning from policy experiments, imitation, and coercion. 
Th erefore, diff usion can be quite benefi cial or ultimately harmful. 
How external diff usion pressures aff ect policy choices depends on 
the  capacity of policy makers, political circumstances surrounding 
policy change, and the characteristics of the policies themselves. 
Such  considerations are important not only for the selection of poli-
cies directly but also for the procedural choices regarding whether 
 policies are formulated at the local, regional, national, or interna-
tional levels.
Th ese complexities all point to major challenges and  opportunities 
for public administration scholars and practitioners. In under-
standing policy choices, scholars should be attuned to the relevant 
mechanisms of policy diff usion. Th ey should consider the attributes 
of the policies that they are studying—whether the  policies are 
simple or complex, whether the policies’ eff ects are opaque or easily 
observed, and so on. Scholars should assess the degree to which the 
relevant policy makers have the capacity to learn eff ectively from 
others’ experiences and the political will to resist competitive or 
coercive pressures.
Although scholars would be remiss in ignoring the policy 
 diff usion literature while examining their chosen policy areas, 
we wish to present not merely a cautionary tale but also a call to 
action. Perhaps better than anyone else, scholars of public admin-
istration are well positioned to advance the literature on policy 
diff usion in new and exciting directions. For example, almost 
all policy  diff usion work to date focuses on the adoption stage of 
the public policy process (but see Karch 2007 and Pacheco and 
Boushey 2012). Yet  public administration scholars know that the 
process does not end at  adoption—rather, policies evolve through 
their implementation. Indeed, implementation may present some 
of the most important opportunities for learning and imitation 
over time and across governments. Extending the policy diff usion 
literature beyond initial policy adoptions is warranted and long 
overdue.
In a similar vein, nearly all policy diff usion 
studies explore legislative adoption by state 
or national governments, while ignoring 
the equally important decisions made by 
executive agencies. In one notable exception, 
Volden (2006) surprisingly fi nds evidence that 
state legislatures learned from other states’ 
experiences much more than administrative 
critical. In contrast, the national government is the best location for 
“redistributive” policies, such as Social Security or Medicare, because 
states or localities could be overwhelmed by competitive pressures 
and thus might adopt insuffi  cient social safety nets in these areas.6 
Such arguments draw deeply on policy diff usion ideas. In short, 
when the positive learning aspects of policy diff usion outweigh the 
negative competitive aspects, policy making is improved by taking 
advantage of such learning opportunities through  decentralization. 
If a policy shifts from redistributive to developmental (e.g., as with 
the change from welfare-only to welfare-to-work programs in the 
mid-1990s), devolution may be appropriate, with the  possibility 
of learning about how to eff ectively encourage employment 
 outweighing any remaining race-to-the-bottom concerns. As with 
all broad classifi cations, however, there are clearly exceptions, such 
as when competition around economic development has led states 
and localities to recruit businesses to their areas by using wasteful or 
ineff ectual subsidies and tax incentives (e.g., Enrich 1996).
Decentralization can unleash the experimental power of policy 
diff usion, just as it can bring about healthy or unhealthy competi-
tion across governments. For example, in the fi rst fi ve years after 
the federal government granted control of new funds for children’s 
health insurance to the states, state governments formally modifi ed 
their Children’s Health Insurance Programs more than 100 times, 
learning from one another’s experiences (Volden 2006). In contrast, 
centralization can stifl e local policy experimentation. For instance, 
when state governments acted in the antismoking policy arena, local 
policy adoptions fell to about 70 percent of their former adoption 
rates (Shipan and Volden 2008). Moreover, when the state govern-
ment also included some preemptive language in its laws, local 
adoption rates fell by more than 90 percent.
Th e 2010 national health care reforms serve as an example of policy 
diff usion at work. Th e national model clearly built on some aspects 
of state policies, such as the individual health insurance mandate 
previously adopted in Massachusetts. Yet the adoption of national 
standards could cause state-level experimentation to be much more 
limited in the future. To attempt to address such limitations, the 
Patient Protection and Aff ordable Care Act includes provisions to 
try to recapture the benefi cial elements of state-level competition 
and experimentation, such as mandated health insurance exchanges 
required in each state. Whether these provisions allow adequate 
 fl exibility and experiential learning to confront new and growing 
health care problems remains to be seen.
Centralization and decentralization decisions, like all major policy 
decisions, are made based on political considerations. Th ose who 
do not like the current policies at the state and local levels seek 
greater centralization during periods of favorable national political 
circumstances, while those who dislike the imposition of national 
policy given their local circumstances demand 
greater decentralization (e.g., McCann 2011). 
Although such preferences drive politics 
and, in turn, infl uence policy, fundamental 
principles of policy diff usion naturally factor 
into discussions about centralization and 
decentralization; however, they may not be 
weighed as heavily as they should be. Policy 
makers should be hesitant to centralize 
Policy makers should be 
 hesitant to centralize control 
over complex and  evolving 
 policies that may be best 
solved over time through 
 experimentation and learning.
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insuffi  ciently acknowledged. Recognizing these processes for 
what they are may make policy makers’ choices more transparent 
and more fully informed, potentially resulting in better public 
policies.
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Notes
1. Th e nearby forests of policy diff usion research in economics and sociology 
off er many additional insights (e.g., Strang and Soule 1998), some of which we 
incorporate here. Graham, Shipan, and Volden (forthcoming) explore potential 
connections in the policy diff usion literatures across the political science 
subfi elds of American politics, comparative politics, and international relations. 
More broadly, policy diff usion is just one type of a larger class of “diff usion of 
innovation” studies explored across the years by Rogers (2003).
2. More generally, see Karch (2007) on how policies that start in a few states can 
bubble up to the national level, which, in turn, aff ects what other states do.
3. Lessons also may not be learned at all, such as with the lack of recognition 
of state health policy experiences during the formulation of national policy 
(Weissert and Scheller 2008).
4. Karch (2006) demonstrates how the federal government’s intervention can 
 infl uence state policy adoptions even when coercion is not involved.
5. Whether policy makers are internally or externally focused seems to  matter 
in other settings and policy areas as well, such as municipal adoption of 
e- government innovations (Jun and Weare 2011).
6. Volden (2005) off ers a theory of how centralization and decentralization deci-
sions are made through credit-claiming and blame-avoidance competitions 
between national and state policy makers. In addition, McCann (2011) casts 
doubt on the empirical veracity of Peterson’s claims (although he might still 
be normatively correct in asserting that states are better equipped to deal with 
developmental policies). Coding all of the provisions in major laws passed over 
a period of several decades, McCann fi nds no evidence that Congress is more 
likely to devolve developmental politics to the states while keeping redistributive 
policies at the national level.
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